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A New Constitution for German
Big Business:
The Co-Determination Act of 1976
This is the text of a speech given by Professor Rittner to the Dickinson
Society of International Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of
California in October of 1976.
By Fitrrz Rrrzn
Ord. Professor of Law, University of Freiburg, Federal Republic
of Germany.
I. THE CENTRAL THEME OF THE STATUTE AND
ITS SCOPE OF APPLICATION
TiHE FEDERAL REPUBLIC of Germany enacted a new co-deter-
mination statute on May 4, 1976.' This Act changes the legal
structure of German corporations so dramatically that there is doubt
whether these entities can still be considered as "corporations" in the
traditional sense of the term. Certainly the idea of corporations being
associations of persons managed by boards required to act in the in-
terest of the shareholders has been eliminated. A new concept has been
introduced-that of a "constitution for enterprises" (Unternehmensver
fassung). At present, this concept only applies to big business; that
is, according to the statutory definition, those enterprises which regu-
larly employ 2,000 or more persons. The new law2 requires that one
half of the members of the supervisory board of those enterprises be
"representatives of the employees." The supervisory board is a German
invention which has also found favor in other countries. It is a body
which functions as an intermediary between the shareholders and the
management. The German Stock Corporation Act.n defines the board's
functions and responsibilities, including the appointment and dismissal
1. Gesetz Ciher die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnebmer (1976 BGBI I S. 1153) of
4 Mai 1976.
2. For discussion reflecting the state of the law prior to the new Act see VAns,
Reforming the "Modem" Corporation, Perspectives from the German, 80 H11v. L. RBv.
23, 64-75 (1966).
3. Aktiengesetz of 6 Sept. 1965 (1965 BGBI I S. 1089).
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of the members of the managing board, as well as the approval of
certain types 6f transactions.
In the Federal Republic of Germany there are 2,200 stock corpora-
tions. These include virtually all major companies, such as Volkswagen,
Daimler-Benz, Mannesmann, Thyssen, Bayer, Deutsche Bank, Allianz-
Versicherung, etc. The stock corporation is the corporate form designed
for large enterprises and is required for all companies that offer their
shares to the public. Smaller companies tend to incorporate as limited
liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung, GmbH),
a form designed for closely held corporations and subject to less
stringent supervision and disclosure requirements.4
The new Co-Determination Act does not apply exclusively to stock
corporations. Other corporate forms,5 including the limited liability
company (GmbH), cooperatives (Erwerbs-und Wirtschaftsgenossen-
schaft) and mining companies (Bergrechtliche Gewerschaften), as well
as partnerships limited by shares (KGaA) are subject to its provisions.
However, there are very few enterprises using these legal forms which
meet the threshold requirement of employing 2,000 or more persons.
Thus, of the some 650 companies to which the statute will actually
apply, only about 40 are not stock corporations or limited liability
companies. Accordingly, the following discussion will not consider
these other types of companies.
It should be noted that the central provision of the new statute,
namely the principle of fifty percent workers' representation on the
supervisory board, operates somewhat differently in enterprises or-
ganized as, for example, limited liability companies, than in stock
corporations. The difference is rooted in the fact that the supervisory
board of a GmbH does not have the same function as that of a stock
corporation. This permits the shareholders of a GmbH to control
management directly rather than through an intermediary supervisory
board. Thus the notion of a single "constitution for enterprises" is
somewhat illusory because the statute does respect, in various pro-
visions, the differences between the various types of corporate forms,
The question may arise as to why the draftsmen of the Act did not
attempt to avoid this' differential treatment since, from a legislative
standpoint, it is inconsistent to have the principle of equal control by
"capital" and "labor" function differently for different types of com-
4. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellsehaften mit beschriinktcr Haftung of 20 April 1892
(RGBI S. 477).
5. Concerning German corporate forms, see generally F. JuLtcrx & L. Scitiinr,
GERmiAN STocr CORPOnATioN ACT 2-4 (1967).
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panies. The answer is that the legislature was primarily concerned
with changing the power relationships within large corporations. The
fact that in Germany, unlike other European countries, smaller enter-
prises are not usually organized in this form allowed the legislature
to address the enactment primarily to stock corporations and thereby
exclude altogether certain other types of business organizations, such
as partnerships (OHG) and limited partnerships (KG). For the poli-
ticians these small enterprises were not worthy targets in the fight for
parity between capital and labor.
II. THE BASIC CONTENT OF THE STATUTE
A. The Voting Process
The details of the co-determination statute primarily affect the
supervisory board of the designated enterprises. The supervisory board
will consist of twelve, sixteen or twenty persons, depending on the
number of regular employees in the enterprise. Only one half of the
members of the supervisory board will be elected by the shareholders.
The other members of the board are to be labor representatives, partly
selected by the employees and partly appointed by the unions whose
members are employed in the enterprise.
The selection of the labor representatives is fairly complicafed. For
example, a twelve or sixteen person supervisory board must include
two union representatives. A twenty person supervisory board requires
three union representatives. Moreover, the statute contains detailed
provisions regarding the number of representatives to be elected by
blue collar workers, salaried personnel and executive personnel. The
statute thus establishes a three class society among employees of an
enterprise and ordains that each of the three classes is to be represented
according to its numerical strength.
The voting procedure might be the most complex in the world.
The election provisions comprise more than 600 sections and the sheer
bulk of the statutory scheme is likely to cause serious difficulties in
interpretation and implementation. Elections are required to be held
approximately every four years. It is anticipated that there will be
a great deal of controversy in this area.
B. The Chairperson of the Supervisory Board
Electing the chairperson for a board comprised of two antagonistic
groups is a difficult task. This problem is compounded by the chair-'
issue
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person's status of primus inter pares. In practice, he is in constant
liaison with the manager or managing board. This function is particu-
larly important where the supervisory board is large, as mandated by
the new Act. The chairperson also conducts the shareholders meetings
in addition to several other important functions. Most importantly,
the chairperson can cast a tie-breaking vote. Thus, there are only two
conceivable ways to achieve full parity between capital and labor:
either have representatives of the two factions alternate regularly, or
have someone selected who belongs to neither of the two social groups,
for example, a professor, a housewife or'a priest. The German legisla-
ture opted for the latter alternative with respect to co-determination in
the coal and steel industry pursuant to an act of 1951.0 Experience
has shown, however, that there are very few truly neutral persons.
For instance, in the coal and steel industry, capital and labor have
made arrangements somewhat along the following lines: the neutral
person in one company may be slightly sympathetic towards labor
whereas in another company the neutral person might lean towards a
capitalistic philosophy. However, this solution is only appropriate in
an oligopolistic industry, if at all.
An initial proposal, endorsed by the government, envisaged an
annual change of chairpersons. This solution proved unacceptable for
two reasons. First the annual rotation endangers the continuity of
office, causing instability. A second and probably more important rea-
son was'that during the consultation concerning the Co-Determination
Act, serious doubts were raised as to the constitutionality of the draft.
The argument was that full parity violates the property guarantee of
Article 14 of the West German Constitution. The argument was suffi-
cient to sway the legislature, which gave the shareholders a small but
significant advantage.
According to Section 27 of the Act, the members of the supervisory
board must first attempt to designate a chairperson jointly. If this
attempt proves unsuccessful, the members of the supervisory board
representing the investors select the chairperson, while the vice-chair-
person is designated by the supervisory board members representing
the employees. Thus the shareholders have a clear advantage, though
it may be lost at times by chance. For example, if the chairperson
cannot officiate at a meeting because of sickness or a traffic jam, the
vice-chairperson would preside.
6. Gesetz fiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnebmer in den Aufsichtsriften und
Vorstinden der Unternebmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stnl erzeugenden In-
dustrie of 21 Mai 1951 (1951 BGB! I S. 347).
C. The Appointment and Dismissal of Members of the Managing Board
The most important task of the supervisory board is the appoint-
ment and dismissal of members of the managing board. Each member's
term, according to Section 24 of the Stock Corporation Act, cannot
exceed five years. One of the principle objectives of the Co-Determina-
tion Act is to provide parity in the selection process. Again, the rules
governing this process are extremely complicated. The Act provides
for essentially three stages:
STEP 1: The supervisory board, by a two-thirds majority, appoints
a member of the managing board. Here the process ends if both
factions agree on the choice.
STEP 2: A committee of the supervisory board, designated on the
basis of parity, agrees on a candidate who is then accepted by the
supervisory board as a whole by simple majority vote. Once again
the two groups must reach agreement. In practice, this step merely
provides pressure for consensus.
STEP 3: Should the first two steps fail to yield a positive result,
the chairperson of the supervisory board may cast a second vote
to break the stalemate. The tie vote procedure was considered
necessary to avoid the constitutional problem.
The practicality of this procedure is questionable. Although it has
never been tried, two typical situations may be anticipated. The first
involves corporations with only one or a few shareholders where the
trend will be to bypass the two initial steps of decision-making. In
other words, the shareholders, relying on the second vote of the chair-
person, will attempt to appoint all members of the managing board.
This would be the case, for example, in wholly owned subsidiaries of
foreign enterprises such as Ford AG, Opel AG, Esso AG, Deutsche
Shell AG and so on. However, this path may not always be open. It
is endangered both by political considerations and various random
factors. Unions and employees may not be prepared to accept a con-
tinual denial of the right to have an effective voice in the appointment
of members of the managing board. Also, the third stage of the selec-
tion process requires presence of the chairperson at the supervisory
board meeting, since he alone can cast a second vote. Moreover, at any
given meeting the number of shareholders' representatives must be at
least equal to the number of labor members to enable the use of the
second vote. The shareholders, therefore, will not only have to consider
whether their representatives have the necessary experience and com-
petence, but they will also have to make sure that their representatives
are in excellent health and stamina. Shareholder representatives must
Issue CO-DETEBnIINATION ACT
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always be punctual, transportation strikes and automobile accidents
notwithstanding.
The second situation involves corporations which are not controlled
by one shareholder or a group of shareholders. Where the chairperson
of the supervisory board lacks the backing of a sole or major share-
holder, it is unlikely that the third phase of the decision-making process
will even be reached. The contending factions within the supervisory
board, as well as the candidates for appointment to the managing
board, will make an all-out effort to achieve results at the first stage.
The ultimate outcome will depend primarily on private negotiations
with the candidates, in which supervisory board members from both
groups will participate on an equal basis.
As a practical matter, labor representatives will increasingly present
their candidates for management positions. In part, these candidates
will be "climbers" trained in union schools who have sufficient ex-
perience .to earn consideration for membership on managing boards.
In part, they will be either opportunists who have discovered an easy
access to a promising career or old-time union members who believe
that it is their turn to land a "cushy" job. Some members of the latter
group may in fact be fit for management positions. Still, it is disturbing
to watch the emergence of standards wholly unrelated to the objectives
and requirements of the enterprise. Until now, members of managing
boards had common goals and could share confidences. The new Act
divides management into "red" and "blue" members. Experiences de-
rived from the Austrian political system during the so-called proporzes 7
suggest that the polarization so created is likely to trickle down to all
levels of corporate activities, so as to produce not only "red" and "blue"
management, but "red" and "blue" clerks and warehousemen as well.
D. Other Functions of.the Supervisory Board
The supervisory board is also responsible for the management of
the enterprise. Most importantly, it must approve major corporate
transactions, as specified in the corporate charter or in the by-laws
adopted by the supervisory board.8 The charters of most German
stock corporations contain a long catalog of transactions that require
supervisory board approval. These customarily include real estate
transactions, guarantees for loans, the appointment of executives, the
appointment of classes of corporate agents and the establishment and
7. That is to say, the practice of altering offices in the executive branch depending
on party affiliation.
8. See Section II (4) of the Stock Corporation Act.
dissolution of branches. To the extent that such a catalog is insufficient,
the supervisory board can specify additional catagories of transactions
that require its approval. Thus, in practice, the supervisory board is
directly involved in all important business, financial and personnel
decisions. Section 29(1) of the Co-Determination Act again provides
for parity in these decisions by requiring a majority vote. This forces
the two factions within the supervisory board to agree, and conse-
quently negotiation is made to play an important role. If, for example,
the managing board wants to close a plant, the labor group may well
condition its consent on special benefits for the displaced workers.
As in the case of managerial appointments, Section 29(2) of the
Act accords the chairperson of the supervisory board a second vote
under certain conditions. The chances are, however, that he will be less
inclined to cast a tie-breaking vote in situations that are not as crucial
as the appointment of the managing board. Thus the bargaining proc-
ess between the managing board and the two groups within the
supervisory board, as an operational rule of the supervisory board
assumes a decisive role.
M. THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE STATUTE
A. The Temporary Character of the Statute
Changes that are likely to occur as a result of the new Act are
difficult to predict. The Act must be viewed as a temporary measure
since it constitutes an important step along an uncertain path.
Even the most vociferous supporters of the Act have divergent
opinions as to the goals of co-determination. Some view it as the next
to last step toward a socialist-type constitution for enterprises, similar
to the Yugoslavian or other socialist models. Others believe that the
Act is necessary to maintain the capitalist system, because worker par-
ticipation could forestall worse alternatives. It is difficult to determine
at this point which school of thought will ultimately triumph.
The temporary character of the statute has been conceded by the
government. Three years ago a committee was appointed to develop
a new concept for the "enterprise system." The committee is still pon-
dering the problems and publication of its recommendations cannot
be expected in the near future. These recommendations will certainly
affect the total revision of the Co-Determination Act of 1976. Eventu-
ally the Act is expected to be discarded in favor of a new statute on
the "enterprise system." One reason for appointing such a committee
ISMu CO-DETERMINATION ACT
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is the strange phenomenon that Germany has four different co-deter-
mination statutes,O with widely divergent provisions as to their scope
of application as well as their substantive co-determination rules. This
legislative arbitrariness and the resulting confusion was caused by ex-
pedience to accommodate the demands of a changing political setting.
B. The Two Other Levels of Labor Co-Determination
The uncertainties of the statute are enhanced by the fact that in
Germany, apart from the Co-Determination Acts, there are two other
levels of labor participation which also have an impact on corporate
decision-making. The first of these levels is the so-called works councils.
The Works Councils Act of 1972,10 successor to the Works Councils Act
of 1952,11 gave employees of German enterprises far-reaching rights
against management. Under Section 87 of the Act of 1972 the works
councils have a voice equal to that of management regarding the
following matters: questions of order within the enterprise and the
conduct of employees in the enterprise; the beginning and end of the
work day, including breaks, as well as the distribution of work time
over the work week; and questions of wage policy within the enterprise.
These are some of the many situations in which the works councils
make decisions jointly with management. If management does not
agree with the works council on such issues, the decision is made by
a joint committee, composed of equal numbers of management and
labor representatives. Accordingly the managing board must frequently
negotiate twice, first with the works council and subsequently with
the labor representatives on the supervisory board.
The second level of worker participation involves the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements. In Germany it is customary to
conclude industry-wide agreements between a union and an industrial
association representing all the enterprises involved. The main topics
of these agreements are minimum wages, minimum vacation time and
other employee benefits. The collective-bargaining mechanism, by its
very nature, presupposes equality of weaponry among the participants
as well as the capacity of each to make independent decisions. The
Co-Determination Act of 1976 upsets this scheme by having labor
share management functions with the subsequent result of having
9. See authorities cited in notes 1 and 5 supra; Sections, 76-77 of the Betrlcbsver-
fassungsgesetz of 11 Oct. 1952 (1952 BGB1 I S. 681) and Mitbestimmungergllnzungs-
gesetz of 7 Aug. 1956 (1956 BGB1 I S. 707).
10. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 15 Jan. 1972 (1972 BGBI1 I S. 13).
11. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 11 Oct. 1952 (1952 BGBI I S. 681).
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labor bargain with itself. Section 33 of the Act extends this idea even
further by providing for a "labor director" on the managing board.
One member of the managing board must be given responsibilities
for labor and related matters, including the negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements. After the Act was promulgated the unions
announced their claim, and now operate on the assumption that labor
will determine the appointment and dismissal of that director. Hence,
in many bargaining situations union representatives will be sitting
across from union representatives. This condition- has been called
"over-parity," a term as illogical as it is cogent.
C. The Effects on Enterprises
The presumable effects of the Co-Determination Act on the ap-
proximately 650 corporations directly affected are numerous.
All observers, including the most fervent supporters of the statute,
expect that corporate decision-making will become more time-con-
suming and more complicated. Conceivably, the loss in efficiency
will diminish the competitiveness of these companies. Moreover, now
that employees have a voice in management, the emphasis will be
on protection of jobs, rather than on efficiency. This clearly will be a
drawback in international competition.
On the other hand, the Act is likely to promote the "integration"
of labor in society, a factor which has produced many favorable ex-
periences. Under the Act there are fewer strikes than in most European
countries and the social climate is quite harmonious and pleasant. Yet
the actual necessity for the Act is subject to serious doubt. It appeared,
until recently, that Germany was well on the way toward establishing
a decent social order that envisaged economic freedom and also pro-
vided substantial protection for the weak without insulting their dig-
nity. At present, Germany may have been diverted from" this path to
head for the point at which there is simply a "change of elites." Ap-
parently a certain segment of union leadership views that as a goal.
Whether workers will permit them to be bosses in the long run, could
be a central question to the German future.
D. The Constitutional Question
The Co-Determination Act is designed to change the economic and
social life of Germany - a change of such magnitude that it arguably
calls for constitutional ratification. Article 15 of the Basic Law of 1949
concerns nationalization. Since co-determination is at least as much
lssue
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of an encroachment on private right as nationalization, it is doubtful
such a major change should be effectuated simply by a statute. The
Swiss considered a similar constitutional amendment authorizing co-
determination, but the amendment was defeated in a referendum.
Even if the Act does violate the German constitution, it would be
difficult to obtain a decision to that effect from the Constitutional
Court. In the lower house of the German Parliament almost all rep-
resentatives voted in favor of the Act, the government coalition as
well as the opposition. The Act was therefore adopted by a majority
sufficient to amend the Basic Law. Given this legislative history, the
Constitutional Court can be expected to disfavor becoming embroiled
in this controversy and escape the criticism it would otherwise draw
by declaring the Act unconstitutional. It would seem the Act will thus
remain on the books, improved perhaps by the interpretations of the
Constitutional Court and by the practical utilization of the Act by the
workers, management and unions.
